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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROCK MANOR TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

:

:

CASE NO. 14382

STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH:
Defendant-Respondent

:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse decision of the
District Court which upheld the decision of the State
Road Commission in its finding that a structure belonging to Plaintiff-Appellant

could not lawfully be used

for outdoor advertising purposes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While Defendant-Respondent agrees, for the most
part, with the statement of facts as set forth in Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, there are some facets of the case
which should be called to the attention of this Honorable
Court.
The plaintiff-Appellant in 1959 built a barn on
its property on the east side of the highway and about

one mile south of Farmington, Utah,

The use of the

structure as a "barn" was a conforming use under local
zoning ordinance.

However, the owner also desired to

use the structure for outdoor advertising purposes and
as to this use it was necessary that Davis County amend
its ordinance to allow such use*

Prior to May 9, 1967,

(the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act)
Davis County did amend its zoning ordinance whereby the
additional use of the "barn" for outdoor advertising was
allowed.

On the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertis-

ing Act on three sides of the "barn" was painted in large
letters an outdoor advertising message.
Under the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act the sign on the "barn" was given a permit for 19671968, which permit was renewed annually in the years 1969,
1970 and 1971.

In 1971 the Act was amended and effective

July 1, 1971, a new three year permit was required and
therefore another 1971 permit was issued for each sign,
even though a 1971 permit had been issued earlier in the
year.
Sometime in September or October of 1972 the "barn"
caught fire, leaving the structure badly damaged and unfit
in its burned-out condition for use as a barn or for use as

outdoor advertising.
i
Counsel has argued in the Statement of Facts that
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entitled to continue its outdoor advertising use subject
to the control of the Act which included keeping a valid
permit on the sign, allowing ordinary maintenance, and
allowing change of advertising copy.
The new "barn11 was constructed on the site of the
old structure and was built around and encompassed the old
structure, thereby increasing the square footage of the floor
area and the sides of the structure.

In May of 1973 the

owner applied to the State of Utah for a permit to place
advertising copy on the re-erected "barn" and was refused.
The owner thereafter placed advertising copy on the "barn"and
has maintained the painted message thereon since that date
without a permit from the State.

Notice to the sign owner

and site owner was given by the State pursuant to the provisions of Section 27-12-136.9 and the owner requested an
administrative hearing before the commission at which hearing the commission decided that the use of the "barn" for
Outdoor Advertising was illegal and the sign was ordered
painted out or otherwise removed from the structure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS SHOWN BY THE RECORDS, EXHIBITS AND TRANSCRIPT AND SHOULD BE
SUSTAINED.
The subject sign, according to the records, was not
properly "permitted" as of the date of the notice of viola-

lion*

The affidav t •-_.'." George K. Fadel would appear to

indicate that a permit for 1971 was affixed :;> the subject sign as of the date of the affidavit.

However, a

close examination of the records shows that the permit,
a copy of which was attached to said affidav»L, is not
the permit which was presumably attached to the "barn11 ••'
when it was "substantially destroyed" by Fire.

The

copy attached to the affidavit shows a permit, Number
2 14142 which is a different permit number from the
permit Number 20186, issued for the years 1471 through
] 9 / 3 inclusive-, IDL the s^qr- --r\ hhe then existing "barn"
approximately one year prior

- -."%-. v-

:

" the fire and

which permit was, according t<* lis- testimony of Mr. Smi th,
the Permit Officer, destroyed Vv

he fire (assuming it

was ever placed thereon).
The foregoing facts as revealed by the record,
although sufficient under the law for removal of the
sign, are not, however, the basis for the decisic;: i
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ture Salt Lake City" painted on three of its sides*
This structure was so badly burned by fire some time
in September or October of 1972 that the owner applied
to Davis County for a building permit to erect a "barn"
where the old structure was located.

The new building

was a newly erected structure and was not merely a repair
of the old one on which was later painted the sign which
sign is the subject of this controversy.

It was the

placing of the new sign on the newly erected structure
or "barn" by the owner which created the violation under
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
Section 27-12-136.4 of this Act provides that all
controlled outdoor advertising signs capable of being
read or comprehended from the main traveled way of an
Interstate or Primary (highway) system shall bear permits.
Then Section 27-12-136.11 of this Act, provides, that signs
lawfully in existence on the effective date of the Act
which become nonconforming by reason of the Act are allowed to remain subject to control and reasonable maintenance
and that further the state may not terminate such non-conforming sign use by preventing or prohibiting reasonable
maintenance. However, if the subject sign is found in
violation of Section 27-12-136.8 or 27-12-136.9 the commission is empowered to remove such sign without payment
of any compensation.

The position of the state is that since the Act
defines "maintenance" in Section 27-12-136•3 (10B) as meaning:

"to repair, refurbish, repaint or otherwise keep an

existing sign structure in a state suitable for use"(emphasis
added) and since Section 27-12-136.3(9) defines the word
"erect" as meaning: "to construct, build, raise, assemble,
place, affix, attache, create, paint, draw or in any other
way bring into being or establish, but does not include any
of the foregoing activities when

performed incident to the

change of an advertising message or customary maintenance of
a sign" (emphasis added) the two terms "erect and ordinary
maintenance"

are mutually exclusive and the newly erected

present structure, having been built after the effective date
of the Act does not qualify for outdoor adverting use, "ordin
ary maintenance" rights having been extinguished along with
the embers of the fire which "substantially destroyed" the
old barn.
It is submitted that when the owner applied to local
authorities for a building permit to erect a "barn," such
application was an admission that "customary maintenance" of
the
/structure was not involved.

The application and permit is-

sued was to erect a new structure, designated as a "barn."
No building permit is ever required to perform and effect
ordinary maintenance and repairs.

Counsel refers to a local Davis County zoning
ordinance which allows within one year the re-erection of
a non-conforming structure which is destroyed by fire or the
elements.

If the "barn" had been a non-conforming structure

under local county ordinance, its rebuilding within the year
as a "barn" would, no doubt, have been allowed as a continuing
non-conforming use pursuant to the provisions of this local
ordinance, but, certainly, this fact would not and should not
allow the local ordinance to control a non-conforming use of
the structure as a sign under state law where the state law
.allows only ordinary maintenace and by implication prohibits
the rebuiliding of a substantially destroyed non-conforming
sign.
The trend of the law, as set forth in some of the
recent decisions of courts of other jurisdictions, and certainly, the more realistic approach, is discussed in the case of
Service Oil Co. vs. Rhodus, 500 P2d 807 (Colo. 1972) wherein
the court referring to the case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, stated on p.813:

"If a

property owner has invested money in improvements in order
to put his property to a particular use, which is lawful at
that time, and if that use is subsequently outlawed by a zoning ordinance, he loses not only the potential use but also
the value of his investment.

To impose this additional loss

upon him is unreasonable, and therefore he is entitled
to continue to use his property as he did before. On
the other hand, if the improvements are destroyed or
abandoned, he has lost the value of his investment independently of the ordinance and there is no reason why
this relationship to the zoning ordinance should be any
different from that of his neighbor whose property was
unimproved." (emphasis added)
The policy of the lav; as expressed by various
courts recently is to restrict rather than encourage nonconforming uses.

Sitgreaves v. Board of Adjustment,

54 A2d, 451? Saddle River ex rel. Perrin v. Babinski,
259 A2d 727.
Nonconforming uses are not looked upon with favor;
they detract from the effectiveness of a comprehensive
zone plan.

Appeal of Roncase (1955, Pa.) 71 Mont. Co.

LR 362; Parks v. Board of County Commissioners (1972 Or.
App.) 501 P2d. 85.
The spirit of zoning is to restrict rather than
increase non-conforming uses, and to eliminate such uses
as speedily as possible.

State ex rel. Peterson v. Burt,

(1969) 42 Wis. 2d 284, 166 NW2d 207.
The case of National Advertising Co. vs. Utah State
Road Commission,

26 U2d 132, 486 P2d 383, cited by the

Plaintiff-Appellant is not in point.

The Supreme Court

ruled in that case that since the sign in question was

erected substantially as discussed and indicated by the
permit officer the state was, in effect, estopped from
requiring its removal without compensation.
That case should be distinguished from the instant case in two particulars:
First, the subject sign structure or "barn" was
not re-erected "substantially" as permitted or allowed
by the permit officer on which an estoppal against the
removal by the state can be claimed.
Second, a new structure was built around the site
of the old one, not as a sign, but as a "barn" and the
question of its use as a sign, also, did not arise until approximately eight (8) months after the original
structure bearing an outdoor advertising message was
substantially destroyed.
CONCLUSION
The use of the "barn" by Plaintiff-Appellant for
Outdoor Advertising is unlawful, since the sign thereon
carries no valid permit from the State of Utah and is a
newly erected structure located in a non-conforming use
area in which area Outdoor Advertising is prohibited pur-

,

suant to the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act.

This Honorable Court should, therefore, sustain the
I

decision of the Coitunission and the Lov/er Court.
Respectfully submitted,
~

,

^

/ / ; /

" LEON A. HALGREN' /
.Assistant Attdrney General
State Capitol
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
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